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This paper reexamines  a classic question  in international  economics:  What is
the current  account  response  to a transitory  income  shock  such  as a temporary
improvement  in the terms  of trade, a transfer  from abroad  or unusually  high
production?  To answer  this question,  we construct  a world equilibrium  model in
which productivity  varies  across  countries  and international  borrowing  and lending
takes place  to exploit good  investment  opportunities.  Despite  its conventional
ingredients,  the model  generates  the novel prediction  that favourable  income  shocks
lead to current  account  deficits  in debtor countries  and current  account  surpluses  in
creditor  countries.  Evidence  from thirteen OECD  countries  broadly  supports  this
prediction  of the theory.
A simple  thought experiment  reveals  how natural  our result  is as a
benchmark  case. Consider  a country  that receives  a favourable  transitory  income
shock.  Suppose  further  that this country  saves  this shock  and has  two investment
choices,  domestic  capital  and foreign loans.  To the extent  that the shock  does not
affect the expected  profitability  of future investments  at home  and abroad,  a
reasonable  guess is that investors  allocate  the marginal  unit of wealth (the income
shock)  among  assets  in the same proportions  as the average  unit of wealth. Since
by definition  the share  of a debtor country's  wealth  invested  in domestic  capital
exceeds  one, an increase  in wealth (savings)  results  in a greater increase  in
domestic  capital (investment),  leading  to a deficit  on the current  account (savings
minus investment).  Conversely,  in creditor  countries  the increase  in wealth exceeds
investment  at home,  as a portion  of this wealth increase  is invested  abroad.  This
produces  a current  account  surplus  in creditor  countries.
IThe sharp result  that comes  out of this simple  example  follows from three
assumptions.  First,  the income  shock  is saved.  Second,  investing  in foreign capital  is
not an option  for the country.  Third,  the marginal  unit of wealth is allocated  among
assets  as the average  one is. We maintain  the first two assumptions  throughout  the
paper  without (excessive)  apologies.  The first assumption  is a basic  tenet of
consumption-smoothing  models  of savings.  Despite  some  empirical  failures  of the
simplest  of these  models,  we feel the jury is still out regarding  the relative
importance  of consumption-smoothing  as a savings  motive  at the business  cycle
frequency  that we focus on here.' The second  assumption  can be easily  removed. 2
If we keep the other  assumptions,  a favourable  income  shock  still leads  to a current
account  deficit if and only if the share of domestic  capital  in the country's  wealth
exceeds  one or, equivalently,  if and only if foreign  debt exceeds  the stock of
outward  foreign investment.  Otherwise  a favourable  income  shock  leads  to a current
account  surplus.
The bulk of the theoretical  effort of this paper  is devoted  to assessing  the
merit  of the third assumption  underlying  our simple  example,  namely,  that the
marginal  unit of wealth (savings)  is invested  in the same proportions  as the stock of
wealth.  To do so, we construct  a simple  world equilibrium  model in which productivity
varies across  countries  and intemational  borrowing  and lending  takes place  to
exploit  good investment  opportunities. In the model,  we distinguish  between
production  uncertainty  and random  changes  in technology. In each date, some
countries  have "good"  production  functions  that exhibit high  average  productivity,
while other countries  have "bad"  production  functions  that exhibit  low average
1 The  importance  of consumption-smoothing  depends  on  the  frequency  of the  data  one  is
analyzing.  It is  obviously  important  for the  analysis  of quarterly  data  (most  people  spend  more
than  they  eam  over  Christmas  and  other  holidays,  and  somewhat  less  than  they  earn  in other
times),  and  almost  as  surely  is  a bad  theory  for understanding  savings  rates  over  a quarter  of
a century.  See  Deaton  (1992)  for a survey  of evidence  on  intertemporal  models  of savings.
2 Moreover,  this  assumption  is consistent  with  the  strong  home  equity  preference  in  OECD
economies  that  has  been  documented  by  French  and  Poterba  (1991)  and  Tesar  and  Werner
(1992).  Lewis  (1995)  surveys  alternative  explanations  for  this  phenomenon.
2productivity. In normal  times, production  functions  do not change  but output is
uncertain.  We use the term output shock  to refer to production  surprises.  These
shocks  do not affect  the probability  distribution  of future productivity  and, as a result,
they have only transitory  income  or wealth  effects on investors.  Occasionally,
countries  perform  economic  reforms  or experience  changes  in their economic
environment  that change  their "bad"  production  functions  to "good"  ones,  or vice
versa. These  events  have persistent  effects on the average  level of productivity,
and we label  them productivity  shocks. Since productivity  shocks  change  the
probability  distribution  of future productivity,  they both have income  or wealth effects
on investors,  and also affect  their investment  strategies.
In our basic model,  we assume  that investors  exhibit  constant  relative  risk
aversion  and have no labour  income.  As a result,  the shares  of wealth invested  in
domestic  capital  and foreign loans depend  only on asset characteristics,  i.e.
expected  retums  and volatilities.  Since  these are not affected  by output  shocks,  we
find that the marginal  unit of wealth (the output shock)  is invested  as the average
one is. Since countries  with high productivity  are debtors,  we find that positive  output
shocks  lead to current  account  deficits  in these countries,  and to current  account
surpluses  in creditor  countries.  This distinction  does not apply  to productivity  shocks.
We find instead  that favourable  productivity  shocks  always  lead to current  account
deficits,  as investors  react  to the increase  in the expected  return  to domestic  capital
by increasing  their holdings  of domestic  capital  and reducing  their holdings  of foreign
loans. The usefulness  of this benchmark  model  is that it highlights  the set of
assumpbons  that underlie  our example:  shocks  have only transitory  income  effects,
investors  exhibit  constant  relative  risk aversion,  and there is no labour  income.
We then proceed  to relax these  assumptions.  First,  we find that if relative  risk
aversion  decreases  with wealth, positive  output  shocks  raise  wealth and induce
investors  to take riskier  investment  positions.  As a result,  the share of the shock
3invested  in rsky domestic  capital  exceeds  its share in wealth. Second,  we show that,
if labour  income  is less risky than capital  income,  positive  output  shocks  raise the
ratio  of financial  to human  wealth and hence  expose  the investor  to greater  risk.
This induces  investors  to take safer investment  positions  in their financial  wealth,
and so the share of the shock invested  in domestic  capital  falls short of its share in
financial  wealth. We obtain a simple rule to determine  when a positive  output  shock
leads  to a current  account  deficit:  the country's  debt has to exceed  a certain
threshold  that depends  on how attitudes  towards risk vary  with wealth and the size
of labour income.  This threshold  can be either positive  or negative,  and is zero in the
case  of constant  relative  risk aversion  and no labour  income.
Our research  naturally  relates  to existing  intertemporal  models  of the current
3 account.  The early generation  of intertemporal  models,  such as Sachs  (1981,1982)
Obsffeld  (1982), Dombusch  (1983)  and Svensson  and Razin (1983),  were designed
to study  the effects  of terms of trade shocks  and to develop  rigorous  theoretical
foundations  for the Harberger-Laursen-Metzler  effect.  We share with these  models
the notion  that countries  save transitory  income  shocks  so as to smooth
consumption  over time. However,  since  these models  abstract  from capital
accumulation,  income  shocks  can only be invested  in foreign loans.  As a result  they
predict  that positive  transitory  income  shocks  lead to current  account surpluses  in all
countries.
Simply  allowing  for capital accumulation  is not sufficient  to obtain  the main
result  of this paper, however.  Subsequent  contributions  by Sachs  (1981), Persson
and Svensson  (1985)  and Matsuyama  (1987)  extended  the early intertemporal
models  to include capital  accumulation  by investors  with perfect  foresight.  These
models  were designed  to analyze  the current  account  response  to persistent  shocks
3See  Obstfeld  and  Rogoff  (1995)  for a survey  of these  models.
4to the profitability  of investment. 4 Since  the assumption  of perfect  foresight  implies
that the return  to investment  is certain,  arbitrage  requires  that the marginal  product
of capital equal  the world interest  rate. This condition,  combined  with the assumption
of diminishing  retums  at the country  level, uniquely  determines  the domestic  stock of
capital independently  of the country's  wealth. Hence,  transitory  income  shocks  which
raise  wealth but do not affect the marginal  product  of capital  are again only invested
in foreign loans, leading  to current  account  surpluses  in all countries.
One can understand  our contribution  as recognizing  that investment  risk has
important  implications  for how the current  account  reacts  to transitory  income
shocks.  Once investment  is modelled  as a risky  activity,  the appropriate  arbitrage
condition  equates  the return  on investment  to the world interest  rate plus a risk
premium.  Since the latter increases  with the share of wealth  held as risky  domestic
capital,  transitory  income  shocks  which do not affect the profitability  of investment,
but do raise wealth, must in part be invested  in domestic  capital  for the arbitrage
condition  to be satisfied. In particular,  we find that the share of the income  shock
that is invested  in domestic  capital exceeds  the income  shock itself in debtor
countries,  but not in creditor  countries. 5
The paper is organized  as follows:  Section 1 develops  the basic model.
Section  2 presents  the main result  of the paper. Section  3 explores  the robustness
of this result.  Section  4 presents  empirical  evidence  for thirteen OECD  countries.
Section 5 concludes.
4These  shocks  correspond  to our  productivity  shocks.
5 Zeira  (1987)  provides  an  overlapping-generations  model  of a small  open  economy  in  which
there  is capital  accumulation  and  investment  risk.  The  latter  arises  from  a stochastic
depreciation  rate.  This  model  is used  to show  that  cross-country  differences  in the  rate  of time
preference  could  explain  the  Feldstein-Horioka  finding  that  savings  and  investment  are  highly
correlated  in a cross-section  of countries.  Interestingly,  he  finds  a U-shaped  relationship
between  the  steady-state  level  of debt  of a country  and  its  rate  of time  preference.  He  does
not  however  explore  the effects  of transitory  income  shocks,  as  we  do here.
51. A Model of International Borrowing and Lending
The world equilibrium  model presented  here is based on the view that
intemational  borrowing  and lending  results  from differences  in investment
opportunities  across  countries  rather  than differences  in the rate of time preference. 6
At each date, some  countries  have "good"  production  functions  that exhibit high
average  productivity,  while  other countries  have "bad"  production  functions  that
exhibit low average  productivity.  Investors  in all countries  are allowed  to borrow  and
lend from each other at an interest  rate r, which is determined  in world equilibrium.
We assume  that the penalties  for default are large enough  that intemational  loans
are riskiess.  Firms  own their capital  stocks  and are financed  by sales of equity in
stock markets.  We assume  that the cost of operating  in foreign stock markets  is high
enough  that only domestic  investors  and firms trade in the domestic  stock market.
This is an extreme,  yet very popular  device  to generate  the strong  home-equity
preference  observed  in real economies. 7
We draw a distinction  between  production  uncertainty  and random  changes
in the state of technology.  In normal  times, countries  have time-invariant  but
stochastic  production  functions.  We use the term output  shocks  to refer to
production  surprises  which occur  during  these normal  times.  Since these shocks  do
not affect the probability  distribution  of future productivity,  they have only transitory
income  or wealth effects  on investors.  Occasionally,  countries  perform  economic
reforms  or experience  other changes  in their economic  environment  that have
persistent  effects  on their average  level of productivity.  We label these  events  as
productivity  shocks  and model  them as random  changes  in the production  function.
6 See  Buiter  (1981)  and  cLarida  (1990)  for  world  equilibrium  models  in  which  borrowing  and
lending  is motivated  by  cross-country  variation  in rates  of time  preference.
7  See  Obstfeld  (1994)  for a discussion  of the  effects  of financial  integration  in  a model  similar
to ours.
6Since productivity  shocks  change  the probability  distribution  of future productivity,
they both  have income  or wealth effects  on investors,  and also affect  their
investment  strategies.
A number  of simplifications  serve  to highlight  the bare essentials  of our
arguments. We consider  a world with infinitely  many  atomistic  countries,  indexed  by
j=1,2....  This allows  us to rule out large-country  effects  and concentrate  on the pure
effects of intemational  linkages. Also, we assume  that there exists  a single  good
which is used for consumption  and investment.  This device  permits  us to focus on
intertemporal  trade and eliminate  the complications  that arise from commodity  trade.
Finally,  we restrict  our analysis  to the steady  state of the model  in which both world
average  growth  and the interest  rate are constant.  This allows  us to focus on the
effects of country-specific  shocks  as opposed  to global shocks.  While these
assumptions  simplify  the analysis  considerably,  we are convinced  that removing
them would  not affect  the thrust of our arguments.
Firms and Technology
Production  is random.  Let qj and kj be the cumulative  production  and the
stock of capital  of the representative  firm of country  j. Also, define  xj as the state of
technology  of this country.  Conditional  on xi,  the production  function  of the
representative  firm is:
dqj = 7j  -kj *dt+cs-kj *dGj  (1)
where  ca  is a positive  constant  and the Ojs  are Wiener processes  with E[dOj]=O  and
E[dOj 2]=dt  and E[d0j-dOm]=O  if j￿m.  Equation  (1) is simply a linear  production  function
7which states  that, conditional  on the state of technology,  the flow of output  (net of
depreciation)  in country  j is a normal  random  variable  with instantaneous  mean
E[dqj]=7rj-kj-dt  and variance-covariance  matrix  defined  by E[dqj 2]=.-ki 2.dt and
E[dqj.dqm]=O  if j￿m.  Realizations  of the dOjs  are output  shocks.  Since these shocks
do not change  the probability  distribution  of future productivity,  they have only
income  or wealth effects  on the owners  of the firm, but do not affect their investment
strategies.
Average  productivity  varies across  countries  and over  time. At each date,
half of the countries  are in a high-productivity  regime,  IrC  = x7,  while the other  half are
in a low-productivity  regime,  7tj  = x, with  X <  i7r.  The dynamics  of 7rj  follow a Poisson-
directed  process:
=O  with probability 1-  *  dt
i  =g(7rj)  with probability  +.dt  (2)
i  if -M = i
wvhere  g(,)  =  -l-  if  'r  j  =  9  ; +, i  and w  are positive  constants  with 7tC  - <a 2 ;
E[d7rj.dOj]=O  and E[d7rj-d7cm]=O  if j#m.8 Equation  (2) states that changes  in regime  are
rare  events  (i.e. they occur  with probability  that goes to zero in the limit  of continuous
time) that are uncorrelated  across  countries  and with the output  shocks  in Equation
(1). Since  the probability  of a change  in regime  is small,  productivity  levels  are
persistent.  Since high(low)-productivity  countries  expect  productivity  eventually  to
decline (increase),  productivity  levels  also exhibit mean-reversion.  Realizations  of
the d7rjs  are productivity  shocks.  Since these shocks  change  the probability
8 Since  there  are  infinitely  many  countries,  each  period  a fraction  +-dt  of the high(low)-
productivity  countries  change  regime.  It follows  that if half  of the countries  are  initially  in each
regime,  half  of the  countries  will  always  be  in  each  regime.
8distribution  of future productivity,  they have both  income  or wealth effects  on the
owners  of the firm,  and they also affect  their investment  strategies.
There  are many  identical  firms in each country  with free access  to existing
technology.  The representative  firm is divided  into kj shares  which have a (constant)
value of one and deliver  an instantaneous  dividend  equal to the flow of production
per unit of capital.  We assume  that the realizations  of past shocks  and the
probability  distributions  of the current  shocks  dOj  and dij are known  by investors
before  production  starts.  However,  the realizations  of the contemporaneous  shocks
dOj  and dirj are only known  after production  is completed  and output  is observed.
Since investors  must commit  their resources  before production  starts,  their
investments  are subject  to uncertainty  related  to the contemporaneous  realizations
of the shocks.  Since investors  can freely  trade  equity after production  is completed,
their investments  are not subject  to uncertainty  related  to future realizations  of the
shocks.  It follows  that the return  process  perceived  by investors  is irj-dt+a-doj,  where
dco  j = -J  - dt + dOi  . Therefore  the expected  return  and volatility  of holding  a share of
a
the representative  firm are  j and a, respectively. 9
Consumption  and Investment  Strategies
Each  country  contains  many  identical  consumer/investors  with a logarithmic
utility  function:
9  Despite  the  fact  that productivity  shocks  affect  the  return  to investment,  they  do  not
contribute  to the mean  and  variance  of the  return  process  since  both  they  occur  infrequently
(with  probability  of order  dt) and  they  are  small  (with  magnitude  of order  dt).
9CD
EfIn cj *  e-P' *  dt  (3)
0
where c is the consumption  of the representative  consumer  in country  j. Let aj and x
be the wealth of this consumer  and the share of wealth that is held in equity,
respectively.  We assume  that aj(O)>O  for all j. Then, the consumer's  budget
constraint  is:
da,  =[(xi - r) *  xj + r)  *  aj  - c  *  dt + Cy  *  x;  *  aj  *  dODj  (4)
This budget constraint  illustrates  the standard  risk-return  trade-off behind  investment
decisions.  If 7rj>r,  increases  in the share of wealth allocated  to equity raise the
expected  return  to wealth by (irj-r)-aj,  at the cost of raising  the volatility  of this return
by s-aj. In Appendix 1, we show that the solution  to the consumer's  problem  is:
cJ =p. aj  (5)
7  -r
x  =  (6)
Equation  (5) states that consumption  is a fixed fraction  of wealth  and is independent
of asset characteristics  i.e. r,  ij  and a. This is the well-known  result  that income  and
substitution  effects  of changes  in asset characteristics  cancel  for logarithmic
consumers.  Equation  (6) shows  that the share of wealth  allocated  to each asset
depends  only on asset characterstics,  i.e. r, xj and a, and not on the level of wealth,
aj. This is nothing  but the simple  investment  rule we used in the example  in the
introduction.
10World Equilibrium
To find the world interest  rate,  we use the market-clearing  condition  for
intemational  loans,  ,(a, - kj) =0,  and the investment  rule in Equation  (6) to obtain:
r _ s-a
2 (7)
where 1 = lim-E  7  *  - . In Appendix  1 we show  that there exists  a
j1  lim - .a,
steady-state  in which both  the world growth  rate and the world average  productivity
are constant.  In what follows,  we assume  that the world economy  is already  in this
steady  state.
Using  the world interest  rate in Equation  (7) and the investment  rule in
Equation  (6) we find that the world distribution  of capital  stocks is given by:
kj = (1  +  )  .a;(8)
Equation  (8) states that the capital  stock of a country  is increasing  in both its wealth
and its productivity.  Interestingly,  this world of stochastic  linear  economies  does not
generate  the usual corner  solution  of a world of deterministic  linear  economies  in
which  all the capital is located  in the country  or countries  that have the highest
11productivity.  In the presence  of investment  risk,  these extreme  investment  strategies
are ruled out by investors  as excessively  risky. In fact, since  we have assumed  that
productivity  differences  are not too large  relative  to the investment  risk, i.e.
7t - 7 < a2, all countries  hold positive  capital  stocks in equilibrium.
Although  world  average  growth  is constant,  this world economy  exhibits  a
rich  cross-section  of growth rates.  To see this, substitute  Equations  (5)-(7)  into (4), to
find the stochastic  process  for wealth:
daj  [(s+  a  )c +Xa-p  t+  i  7t)da 
The growth rate consists  of the return  to the country's  wealth minus  the consumption
to wealth ratio.  The first term in Equation  (9) is the average  or expected  growth rate,
and is larger  in high-productivity  countries,  since these  countries  obtain a higher
average  retum on their wealth.  The second  term in Equation  (9) is the unexpected
component  in the growth rate, and is more  volatile  in high-productivity
countries,  since  these countries  hold a larger  fraction  of their  wealth in risky  capital.
122. Determinants of the Current Account
The model  developed  above  describes  a world equilibrium  in which high-
productivity  countries  borrow  from low-productivity  countries  since the former have
access  to better investment  opportunities  than  the latter.  The amount  that high-
productivity  countries  borrow  is limited  only by their  willingness  to bear risks. To see
this, let fj be the net foreign  assets of country  j, i.e. fj=arkl , and use Equation  (8) to
find that:
j  =  a  i2  *a  (10)
Since  n  le  < ix, high-productivity  countries  are debtors,  fj<0,  while low-productivity
countries  are creditors,  fj>O.  Equation  (10)  shows that,  for a given level of investment
risk, the volume  of borrowing  and lending  is larger  the larger  are the cross-country
productivity  differentials.  Also note that,  for a given productivity  differential,  the
volume  of borrowing  is larger  the lower  is the investment  risk. Finally,  observe  that a
country  can move  from lender  to borrower  (borrower  to lender)  if and only if it
experiences  a positive  (negative)  productivity  shock.10
Next  we examine  the behavior  of the curent  account  in this world equilibrium.
First,  we derive  the stochastic  process  for the current  account  and comment  on its
salient  features.  Second,  we provide  an intuition  as to the main economic  forces that
10  In this  world,  a  .sudden  and  large  current  account  deficit  that  tums  a country  from  creditor  to
debtor  should  be  seen  as  a positive  development.  This  notion  is cleady  at odds  with  widely-
held  beliefs  in policy  circles.
13determine  how the current  account responds  to shocks.  Throughout,  we emphasize
the differences  in the current  account  between  debtor and creditor  countries.' 1
Current  Account  Paftems
Since the current  account  is the change  in net foreign  assets, i.e. df1 , we
apply Ito's lemma  to (10)  and use Equation  (9) to find the following  stochastic
process  for foreign assets:
dfj (+  5  3  +7Ca  M_p  fj djt+  a+  )f,f  )  j  j  iX-(1
Equation  (11) states that net foreign assets  follow a mixed  jump-diffusion  process
and provides  a complete  characterization  of their dynamics  as a function of the
forcing processes  dOj  and dxj (remember  that do) =  i *  dt + dOj),  and all the
parameters  of the model  a, p, +, 7c and iE.
Consider  first the prediction  of the model  for the average  or expected  current
account  in debtor  and creditor  countries.  Taking expectations  of (11)  yields:
1'  The  reader  might  ask  why  emphasize  the  debtor/creditor  distinction  instead  of the  highAow
productivity  distinction.  There  are  two  reasons.  From  a  theoretical  viewpoint,  one  could
defend  this  choice  by  pointing  out  that  the  debtor/creditor  distinction  is more  robust.  In our
model,  only  cross-country  differences  in average  productivity  determine  whether  a country  is
a debtor  or a creditor.  If we  assume,  for instance,  that high  average  productivity  is associated
with  high  volatility  in production,  it is then  possible  that  the  high-productivity  technology  might
be  unappealing  enough  to tum high-productivity  countries  into  creditors  (see  Devereaux  and
Saito  (1997)).  In  this  case,  all  the results  presented  in  this  paper  would  still  hold  true  for the
debtor/creditor  distinction,  but  not  for the  high/low  productivity  distinction.  From  an  empirical
viewpoint  and  anticipating  that  the  predictions  of the model  will  be  confronted  with  the  data,
one  could  defend  the  use  of the  debtor/creditor  distinction  based  on  the observation  that
existing  measures  of net  foreign  asset  positions  of countries  are  of much  better  quality  than
those  of their  average  productivity.
14E [d%]<  +  f)  +_.2_7-&  -P]. fj. dt+  i) .fj .dt  (12)
Equation  (12)  separates  the expected  current  account into  two pieces,  which
capture  the effects of expected  savings  and expected  changes  in asset returns,
respectively.  The first term reflects  consumption  "tilting"  by agents. If the expected
return  to wealth  exceeds  (does not exceed)  the rate of time preference,  i.e.
(6 +  + X  -a2>  (<) p, consumers  will find it optimal  to save (dissave)  so as
to "tilt"  their consumption  profile.  These  savings  or dissavings  are allocated  across
assets  in the same  proportions  as the existing  stock of wealth. Ceters paribus,  this
means  that, in growing  economies,  debtors  countries  on average  run current
account deficits,  while creditors  have surpluses  on average.  The opposite  is true in
economies  with negative  growth.  The second  term in Equation  (12) captures  the
effects  of mean reversion  in productivity.  Since productivity  in debtor  countries  is
above its long-run  average,  it is expected  to decline,  while  the converse  is true for
creditor  countries.  Reductions  (increases)  in productivity  induce  investors  to reduce
(increase)  their holdings  of capital  and instead lend (borrow  from) abroad.  Ceteris
paribus,  this means  that debtor countries  on average  experience  current  account
surpluses,  while creditor  countries  on average  experience  deficits. The balance  of
the two effects  is ambiguous  in growing  economies,  and depends  on all the
parameters  of the model.  The faster the economy  grows and the smaller  the mean-
reverting  component  of productivity  is, the more  likely  it is that on average  debtors
run current  account deficits  and creditors  run current  account  surpluses.
15Both  output  and  productivity  shocks  contribute  to the  variance  of the  current
account.  To  see  this,  note  that it follows  from  Equation  (1  1) and  the  definitions  of the
shocks  that:
:~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Va[:(±  .f  +f  dt  (13)
In normal  times  (i.e.  with  probability  close  to one)  d7cj=O  and  fluctuations  in the
current  account  are  driven  by  the  output  shocks.  These  shocks  have  small  effects
(of order  dt~A)  but  occur  with  high  probability  (of  order  1).  Their  contribution  to the
variance  of the  current  account  is  captured  by the  first  term  of Equation  (13).  At
some  infrequent  dates  (i.e.  with  probability  close  to zero)  diij￿O and  the  behavior  of
the  current  account  is dominated  by  productivity  shocks.  Although  these  shocks
occur  with  small  probability  (of  order  dt),  they  do have  large  effects  on the  current
account  (of  order  1)  since  they  induce  a reallocation  of investors'  portfolios.  Their
contribution  to the variance  of the current  account  is captured  by the second  term of
Equation  (13).
The  Current  Account  Response  to Shocks
We are  now  ready  to examine  perhaps  the  most  novel  finding  of this  paper,
that  the  response  of the  current  account  to an output  shock  depends  on  whether  a
country  is a debtor or a creditor. This result  follows directly  from Equation  (1  1).
Since a +  ->  0, a positive  output shock,  i.e. dth>a,  leads  to a current  account
deficit  in debtor countries  and a current  account  surplus  in creditor  counties. To
develop  an intuition  for this result,  we focus on the savings-investment  balance.
16The permanent-income  consumers  who populate  our world economy  save in
order to smooth  their  consumption  over  time. Since the output  shock represents  a
transitory  increase  in income,  it is saved (recall  Equation  (9)). This is true regardless
of whether  a country  is a debtor or a creditor,  and is a typical  feature  of intertemporal
models  of the current  acount.
Having  decided  to save the output  shock,  investors  must then decide  how to
allocate  these additional  savings  between  domestic  equity and foreign loans.  We
depart from previous  intertemporal  models  of the current  account  in how we model
this decision. Since  the investores  desired  holdings  of equity are equal  to the
country's  stock of capital in equilibrium,  Equation  (6) can be interpreted  in terms of a
familiar  arbitrage  condition:
7  =r+o 2 ._  (14)
a.
Equation  (14) states that expected  rate of return  to equity,  7ij,  must equal  the world
interest  rate, r, plus the appropriate  risk or equity premium,  a2-(k<aj).  In this world of
logarithmic  investors,  this risk premium  is is nothing  but the covarance between  the
return  to equity and the return  to the investors'  wealth. The larger is the share of
domestic  capital  in investors'  wealth,  the larger is this covarance and the larger  is
the risk premium  that investors  require  to hold  the marginal  unit of equity.  The
additional  savings  that result  from the output  shock  allow investors  to increase  their
holdings  of risky domestic  equity  without increasing  the risk of their portfolios,
provided  that they keep the share of equity in their portfolios  constant. Thus,  the
marginal  unit of wealth (the output  shock)  is invested  in the same  proportions  as the
average  one. Since by definition  the share of a debtor  country's  wealth  devoted  to
domestic  capital exceeds  one, an increase  in wealth (savings)  results  in a greater
increase  in domestic  capital  (investment),  leading  to a deficit on the current  account.
17Conversely,  in creditor  countries  the increase  in wealth  exceeds  investment  at home,
as a portion  of this wealth increase  is invested  abroad.  This produces  a current
account surplus  in creditor  countries.
This discussion  emphasizes  the importance  of allowing  for investment  risk in
predicting  the current  account  response  to an output shock.  To the extent  that this
form of uncertainty  is important,  existing  models  of the current  account  that assume
investment  is a riskiess  activity,  or else abstract  entirely  from capital  accumulation,
provide  a misleading  description  of how the current  account  responds  to output
shocks.1 2
We now tum to the response  of the current  account  to productivity  shocks.
X  -7t
First,  since a +  > 0, the second  term of Equation  (11)  shows that a positive
productivity  shock,  i.e. d7ir>0,  generates  an income  effect that leads to a current
account deficit  in debtor  countries  and a current  account  surplus  in creditor
countries.  This effect is formally  equivalent  to that of an output shock  and requires
no further discussion.
Second,  a productivity  shock  has a rate-of-retum  effect on investment  since it
changes  the probability  distribution  of future productivity. 13 When a creditor (debtor)
country  receives  a positive  (negative)  productivity  shock,  the expected  return  to
equity increases  (falls).  This induces  investors  to hold a larger  (smaller)  fraction  of
their  portfolio  in domestic  equity and,  as result,  generates  an investment  boom
12 The  large  equity  premium  observed  in the  data  suggests  that  investment  risk  is an
important  feature  of real  economies.  A prediction  of this model  is  that  this  equity  premium,
a
2 +.j-,n  should  be  larger  in  debtor  countries.  To  the best  of our  knowledge,  this  result  is new
and  has  not  been  tested  yet.
13 As Equation  (5)  shows,  income  and  substitution  effects  of changes  in  the expected  return  to
equity  cancel  in our  world  of logarithmic  consumers.  In models  with  more  general  preferences
these  rate-of-return  effects  of productivity  shocks  could  be  associated  with  consumption
booms  or busts,  depending  on  the  balance  of their  income  and  substitution  effects.
18(bust).  The counterpart  of this investment  response  is a current  account  deficit
(surplus)  and is reflected  in the third term of Equation  (11). Since rate-of-retum
effects  of productivity  shocks  consist  of reallocations  in the stocks of assets,  their
effects  on the current  account  are much  larger  (of order 1) than the income  effects
of the same  shocks  (of order dt).1 4 Since productivity  shocks  are infrequent  but have
large  effects, they would  show up as large spikes  in a time series of the current
account.
14 And, for that matter,  much larger  than  the income  effects  of output  shocks  (of order  dt/).
193. Investment Strategies
The theory developed  above  predicts  that the current  account response  to
output  shocks  is different in debtor and creditor  countries.  Instrumental  in deriving
this result  were our assumptions  regarding  how investors  trade risk and return.
These  assumptions  ensured  that the marginal  and average  propensities  to invest  in
foreign loans coincide.  However,  there is a long and distinguished  literature  that
analyzes  how optimal  investment  strategies  depend on attitudes  towards risk, the
size and stochastic  properties  of labour  income  and the correlation  between  asset
retums  and changes  in the investment  opportunity  set and other  aspects  of the
investor's  environment. 15 A general  finding  of this literature  is that one should  not
expect  that marginal  and average  propensities  to invest  coincide.
The purpose  of this section  is to show  that a modified  version  of our result
holds in a generalized  model  that allows  attitudes  towards  risk to vary  with the level
of wealth and introduces  riskless  labour  income.16  In the generalized  model
presented  here,  marginal  and average  propensities  to invest  in foreign loans differ.
However,  we find a simple  rule which determines  when a positive  output  shock leads
to a current  account  deficit: the country's  debt has to exceed  a threshold  that
depends  on (1) how attitudes  towards  risk vary  with wealth, and (2) the size of
labour  income.  This  threshold  can be either positive  or negative,  and is zero in the
benchmark  case  of constant  relative  risk aversion  and no labour  income.  We
therefore  have the modified  result  that favourable  output shocks  lead to current
15 See  Merton  (1995)  for an  overview  of this  research,  and  Bodie,  Merton  and  Samuelson
1  992)  for an  example  with  risky  labour  income.
6We  do  not  explore  the  implications  for our  argument  that  arise  from  the possibility  that
asset  returns  be  correlated  with  changes  in  the  investors'  environment.  These  correlations
give  rise  to a hedging  component  in  asset  demands  that  greatly  depends  on  the  specifics  of
the model.
20account deficits  in sufficiently  indebted  countries.  Otherwise,  they lead to current
account surpluses.
Two Extensions
To allow  attitudes  toward  risk to vary with the level of wealth,  we adopt the
following  Stone-Geary  utility  function:
EJln(cj +  j) *  ePt  *dt  15)
0
where  the f3js  are constants,  possibly  different  across  countries.  The coefficient  of
relative  risk aversion,  i.e.  j  , varies across  countries  and overtime, as follows.
cj +Pj
For a given  level of consumption  or wealth, risk aversion  is decreasing  in %j.  More
important  for our purposes,  if Pj<O  (,Bj>0),  investors  exhibit decreasing  (increasing)
relative  risk aversion  as their level of consumption  increases.  17
To introduce  labour  income,  we assume  that there  is an additional
technology  that uses  labour  to produce  the single good.  18 Normalizing  the labour
force of each country  to one,  the flow of output  produced  using  the second
technology  is given by Xi ' dt. Labour  productivity,  k,is  assumed  to be constant
although it might  vary across  countries.  Workers  are paid a wage equal  to the value
17 As is well-known,  consumers  with  Stone-Geary  preferences  might  choose  negative
consumption.  We ignore  this  in what  follows.
18 The  assumption  of an  aggregate  linear  technology  between  labour  and  capital  is much  less
restrictive  that  it might  seem  at first  glance.  It arises  naturally  in models  where  some  form  of
factor-price-equalization  theorem  holds.  One  could,  for example,  use  the  model  in  Ventura
(1997)  to endogenously  generate  a linear  technology.  We do  not  do  so here  to save  notation.
21of their marginal  product,  i.e. X).dt.  The existence  of labour  income  complicates  only
slightly  the consumers budget  constraint:
daj =  [((7j -r)*xj  +r)*aj +1j -ci]dt+x,  -aj -a.dc  k  (16)
To ensure  that all countries  hold positive  capital  stocks in equilibrium,  we assume
that aj(O)>  >xi2  -
7i -a2
The representative  consumer  residing  in country  j maximizes  (15) subject  to
the budget  constraint  (16)  and the (correct  in equilibrium)  belief that r is constant  and
ixj  follows  the dynamics  in Equation  (2). In Appendix 1, we show that the solution  to
this generalized  consumees  problem  is:
(  . Xi +j)  (17)
(  r+  *P  a,  j  )  c  (18)
Equations  (17)  and (18)  illustrate  how optimal  consumption  and investment  rules
depend on both  attitudes  towards risk and the presence  of labour  income. Note  first
that if consumers  exhibit constant  relative  risk aversion,  Pj=O,  and there is no labour
income,  Xj=O,  Equations  (17)  and (18) reduce  to the consumption  and investment
rules of the previous  model  (Equations  (5) and (6)).  As before,  consumption  is linear
in wealth and income  and substitution  effects  of changes  in the expected  return  to
equity cancel.  Equation  (18) shows  that the share of wealth devoted  to equity
decreases  with  wealth if and only if  j+p,j>O.  To interpret  this condition,  note  first that
if Pj>O,  consumers  exhibit  increasing  relative  risk aversion,  and so choose  to allocate
22a smaller  share of wealth to risky domestic  capital  as their wealth increases.
Second,  note that in the presence  of riskiess  labour  income,  Xj  >0, increases  in
financial  wealth raise  the ratio  of financial to human  wealth, and, ceteris  paribus,
expose  the investor  to greater risk. In response,  agents adopt less aggressive
investment  strategies,  and the share of financial  wealth devoted  to risky domestic
capital  falls. Finally,  holding  constant  the level  of wealth, investors  with low relative
risk aversion,  i.e. high values of f3j,  and/or  a relatively  large  stream  of riskless  labour
income,  i.e. high values  of Xj,  will devote a larger share of their  wealth to risky
domestic  capital.
World  Equilibrium
To compute  the world equilibrium  interest  rate, we impose  once again  the
I  J
market-clearing  condition  for international  loans, lim I  Ea,  -kj  =0  and use the
investment  rule (18)  to find that Equation  (7) is still valid.  Appendix 1 shows  that, if
I  J
limm.  *  Xk  + ,j  = 0, there exists  a steady-state  in which both  the world growth rate
and world average  productivity  are constants.  In what follows,  we assume  that this
restriction  regarding  the cross-country  distribution  of parameters  is satisfied  and that
the world economy  is in the steady  state.
The world  distribution  of capital  stocks is now given by a straighfforward
generalization  of Equation  (8):
k~  =(aXJ  +.(i)J  (19)
23As before, the capital stock of a country is increasing in both its productivity and
wealth, and moreover, the world distribution of capital stocks is non-degenerate
since the restrictions that a,(0) >  2  and X - _  < CT, jointly ensure that all
countries hold positive capital stocks in equilibrium. 19 In addition, countries whose
residents have a high tolerance for risk and/or high labour productivity, i.e. high Pi
and/or bj, have large domestic capital stocks.
We find, once more, that while the world average growth rate is constant, the
world economy exhibits a rich cross-section of growth rates. To see this, substitute
Equations (17)-(18) and (7) into the budget constraint in Equation (16) to obtain:
daj =0  X  s  - 7c2  +  a  2 -. 1+Xi  + §i  )  t+6+7r  - )  1  4+8  ).d
aj  L  +  dt  a;9  *r  (7 -62  a, *  6i- 
(20)
As before, high productivity countries grow faster and experience more volatile
growth than low productivity countries. Perhaps the most interesting difference
between this growth rate and the special case in Equation (9) is that, if Xj+fj>0
(Xj+f3j<O),  both the growth rate of a country and the volatility of the growth rate
decline (increase) with the level of wealth. This is a consequence of the investment
strategy described n Equations (18). If Xj+,3j>O  (Xj+, 3j<O),  investors invest a smaller
(larger) share of their wealth to risky domestic capital as their wealth increases,
lowering (raising) both the expected return on their wealth and the volatility of that
return.
19 The first parameter  restriction  ensures  the first parentheses  in Equation  (19)  is positive.
24Determinants  of the  Current  Account
We are now ready to examine  the behaviour  of the current  account in this
more  general model. The world distribution  of loans  is given by the following
generalization  of Equation  (10):
fi  ~  v2  ai  2-  (21) a~~~~~~~~~~
As before,  the model  describes  a world equilibrium  in which, conditional  on the level
of wealth, high-productivity  countries  borrow  from low-productivity  countries  in order
to take advantage  of better  investment  opportunities  at home.  This is reflected  in the
first term in Equation  (21). In addition,  the international  pattern  of borrowing  and
lending  reflects  cross-country  differences  in attitudes  towards  risk and the
characteristics  of labour income  across  countries.  Countries  populated  by investors
who have a high (low) tolerance  for risk and/or a large (small)  stream  of riskless
labour  income  XR+jpj>O  (Xj+, 3j<O)  are, ceteris  paribus,  more  likely  to be debtors.
We find the current  account by applying  Ito's lemma  to Equation  (21)  and
using Equations  (17) and (20):
df] [f+  r  +ICC  _  a2 -.  (fj +.)i  +Pi )*  t +(  + i-f)*  f+--P+i  )  dt)o  +(  +  i+Bj  2
(22)
The current  account  again follows  a mixed  jump-diffusion  process,  with dynamics
that can be completely  characterized  in terms of the underlying  shocks,  dOj  and ditj,
25and all the parameters  of the model,  a, p,  n,i,  x,  Xj  and fj. Since we have assumed
I that lim  J,  * Ex  +  ipj  = 0, the results  of the previous  section may be thought of as
describing  the determinants  of the current  account  for an average  or "typical"
country  where Xj+pj=O.  Comparing  Equations  (22)  and (11),  we see that they are
identical  provided  that we replace  fj with fj +  Thus, all of the results  in
Section  2 generalize  in a straightforward  manner  provided  that this modified
definition  of debt is used.  Accordingly,  we restrict  ourselves  here to a brief
discussion  of the additional  insights  obtained  from the more general  model regarding
the response  of the current  account  to output shocks.
Since cy  +  j  > 0,  Equation  (21)  shows  that a positive  output shock,  i.e.
X.  +f3
dOj>O,  leads  to a current  account  deficit in countries  where f  +  J  < 0  and a
surplus  in countries  where f  +  i  pi > 0.  This result is again best understood  in
terms of the savings-investment  balance. As in the model  of the previous  section,
savings  behaviour  is very standard  and reflects  the desire  of agents  to smooth  their
consumption  in the face of transitory  income  shocks. Where  our results  differ from
the existing  current account  literature  is in how these savings  are allocated  across
assets. Rearranging  Equation  (18),  we obtain the following  generalization  of the
arbitrage  condition  in Equation  (14).
Xi  =r+CYa  (.  f2).a 1 +X  (23)
26The risk premium  is the product  of two terms.  The first is the covariance  between  the
return  on equity and the return  on an investor's  portfolio,  which is greater  the larger
is the volatility  of equity returns  and the larger is the share of wealth invested  in
domestic  equity, a .(kj/aj). The second  term is the coefficient  of relative  risk aversion
(I  a2 )  ai  20
of the investor's  value function,  /  . In the model of the previous
(it-C  2)-  a;  + x  +Oj
section Xj+pj=O  and this coefficient  was equal  to one. In this more  general setting,  it
depends  on both attitudes  towards  risk and the relative  importance  of riskiess  labour
income.  Most important  for our results  is that this term is decreasing  (increasing)  in
wealth  provided  that Xj+f3j<O  (j+,Pj>O).  Suppose  now that a country  experiences  a
positive  output  shock  that raises investors'  wealth. If the marginal  unit of wealth is
invested  in exactly  the same  proportions  as the average  unit,  the overall  risk
premium  falls (rises)  if kj+pj,<O  (?j+pj>O),  and Equation  (23) no longer holds. Hence,
for the arbitrage  condition  to be satisfied,  the marginal  unit of wealth invested  in risky
domestic  capital  must exceed  (be less than)  the average  unit.
This result  qualifies  the relationship  between  debt and the response  of the
current  account  to output shocks.  If X)j+,j<O  (Xj+,pj>O),  a country  may be a creditor
(debtor)  and yet experience  a current  account  deficit (surplus)  in response  to a
favourable income  shock. If relative  risk aversion  decreases  with  wealth, positive
output  shocks  that raise  wealth induce  investors  to take riskier  investment  positions.
As a result,  the share of the marginal  unit of wealth invested  in risky domestic  capital
exceeds  its share in average  wealth. Depending  on the magnitude  of this effect,
some  creditor  countries  might  run current  account  deficits.  Since labour income  is
less  risky than capital  income,  positive  output  shocks  raise the ratio  of financial  to
20 The  coefficient  of relative  risk  aversion  of the  value  function  tells  us how  the  consumer
values  different  lotteries  in  wealth,  as  apposed  to the coefficient  of relative  risk  aversion  of
the  utility  function,  which  tells  us  how  the consumer  values  different  lotteries  over
consumption.  The  latter  depends  only  on preferences,  while  the  former  depends  on  both
preferences  and  other  aspects  of the  consumers'  environment.
27human  wealth and hence expose  the investor  to greater  risk. This induces  investors
to take safer investment  positions  in their  financial  wealth, and so the share of the
shock invested  in domestic  capital  falls short of its share in financial  wealth. Hence,
some debtor countries  might  run current  account  surpluses  in response  to a
favourable  output  shock.
In summary, we find a simple rule to determine  the response  of the current
account to a favourable  output  shock. If the level of debt exceeds the following
threshold -fj  >  i  Jp then  favourable  output  shocks  lead to a current  account
deficit. Otherwise,  they lead to a current  account  surplus.  This threshold  can be
positive  or negative,  and in the special  case  of the previous  sections  is equal  to
zero. Finally,  note that using  Equation  (21)  we can rewrite  this condition  as nj>7C.
That is, high-output  shocks  lead to current  account  deficits  in high-productivity
21~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~2
countries and current account surpluses in low-productivity countries.2
21 Once  again,  remember  that  this  is a consequence  of our  assumption  that  there  are  no
differences  across  countries  in volatilities.  See  footnote  11.
284. Empirical  Evidence
In this section,  we present some  preliminary  empirical  evidence  that broadly
supports  the theory  developed  above.  This evidence  is not intended  as a formal  test
of the theory, but rather  as suggestive  that we are capturing  some  aspects  of the
behaviour  of the current  account  in the real world.  We begin  by assuming  that Xj+p3
and itj  are unobservable.  Hence,  the threshold  level  of debt above  which output
shocks  lead  to current  account  deficits  cannot  be observed.  Under  this assumption,
the content  of our theory  can be understood  as a probabilistic  statement  that the
higher  is the level of debt of the country,  the more  likely favourable  output  shocks
lead to current  account  deficits. 22 We take per capita GNP growth  as an imperfect
measure  of the shocks  emphasized  by the theory.  This measure  is imperfect  since it
does not distinguish  between  output  and productivity  shocks.  Yet to the extent that
output  shocks  are present  in the data,  we would expect  to find that the correlation  of
the current  account  with per capita GNP growth is smaller  in countries  with higher
levels  of debt.  Accordingly,  we study how this correlation  varies with the level of debt
of a country.
Data
For our empirical  work,  we require  appropriate  measures  of debt and the
current  account. We construct  a measure  of debt using data  on the international
investment  positions  (liPs) of OECD  economies  as reported  in the International
Monetary  Fund's  Balance  of Payments  Statistics  Yearbook.  The IIP is a compilation
22 The  unconditional  probability  of an  output  shock  leading  to a current  account  deficit  is
Pr(kj+3j>-r-fj)=Pr(aj>i)=1/2.  However,  conditional  on  the level  of debt  of the  country  and  for
any  distribution  of kj+pj,  this  probability  is Pr(kj+Pj>-r-fjlfj)  which  is increasing  in  fj.
29of estimates  of stocks of assets  corresponding  to the various  flow transactions  in the
capital  account of the balance  of payments,  valued  at market  prices.  We measure
debt as minus  one times  the net holdings  of public  and private bonds,  and other
long- and short-term  capital  of the resident  official and non-official  sectors,
expressed  as a ratio  to GNP.  However,  as noted in the introduction,  this measure  of
debt cannot be used  to infer the share of wealth  held as claims on domestic  capital,
since it does not take into account  the fact that the countries  in our sample  can hold
their wealth in three  forms:  debt, domestic  capital,  and capital  located  abroad.
Accordingly,  we subtract  outward  foreign  direct investment  and holdings  of foreign
equity by domestic  residents  from debt  to arrive  at an "adjusted  debt"  measure.
Figure  Al  plots  the time series for debt and adjusted  debt for the thirteen OECD
economies  for which we are able to construct  these variables. 23 Table 1 presents  an
overview  of the data for the sample  of 13 OECD  countries  for which it is possible  to
construct  adjusted  debt measures.  The first column reports  the net external  debt of
country  j, expressed  as a fraction  of GNP,  while  the second  column  reports  the
holdings  of claims  on capital  located  abroad.  The third column  reports  the difference
between  the first two columns,  our "adjusted  debt"  measure.
We measure  the current  account  as the change  in the international
investment  position  of a country,  expressed  as a fraction  of GNP.  Since lIPs are
measured  at market  prices,  the change  in the IIP reflects  both  the within-period
transactions  which comprise  the conventional  flow measure  of the current  account,
as well as revaluations  in the stock of foreign assets. Figure  A2, which plots the
conventional  measure  of the current  account and the change  in the IIP for each of
the countries  in our sample,  reveals  that the contribution of revaluation  effects  to
the change  in the IIP is substantial  in most countries.
23 The final sample  of countries  is determined  by the limited data  availability  for these  series.
A complete  description  of the data is provided  in Appendix  2.
30Current Account Cyclicality in Debtor and Creditor Countries
We are now ready  to examine  how the cyclicality  of the current  account
vanes  with the level  of debt of a country.  Table 2 presents  a first look at the
evidence. The first column  reports  the average  level  of adjusted  debt over the
period  1971-93,  while the second  column  reports  the time-series  correlation  of the
current  account  surplus  (expressed  as a share of GNP)  with per capita GNP growth
over the same  period,  for each of the countries  in our sample.  In six out of seven
countries  where adjusted  debt is positive,  the current  account is countercyclical
(Sweden  is the only exception),  while in five out of six countries  where adjusted  debt
is negative,  the current  account is procyclical  (Japan is the only exception).  This
pattern is highlighted  in Figure 1, which plots  the cyclicality  of the current  account
(on the vertical  axis) against  the level  of adjusted  debt (on  the horizontal  axis).
There is a clear negative  relationship,  and the simple  correlation  between  the two
variables  is -0.54.
Although  highly  suggestive,  the results  in Table 1 should be interpreted  with
some  caution as they pool information  within  countries.  To the extent  that country-
specific levels  of productivity  are constant  over time, this poses no particular
difficulties.  However,  if changes  in productivity  are important  in the data, the simple
time series correlations  in Figure 1 may obscure  variations  over  time in the cyclicality
of the current  account  within countries.  To address  this concem,  we adopt the
following  strategy. First,  we pool  all country-year  pairs  of observations  and rank
them by their adjusted  debt. We then divide  the sample  in two at a particular
threshold  level of adjusted  debt. Then,  for the two subsamples,  we compute  the
31cyclicality  of the current  account  for the two subgroups  and test whether  they are
significantly  different. 24
Figures  2(a)-2(d)  present  the results  of this robustness  check  for various
subsamples  of the data. In each figure,  the bold (solid)  line plots the cyclicality  of the
current  account in debtor (creditor)  countries  for the corresponding  level of adjusted
debt at which the sample is divided in two, indicated  on the x-axis. The dashed  line
reports  the p-value  for a test of the null hypothesis  that the cyclicality  of the current
account is equal in the two groups. Figure  2(a) uses data  for all countries  over  the
entire period  from 1971  to 1993, and reveals  that current  accounts  are clearly
procyclical  in creditor  countries  and countercyclical  in debtors. Moreover,  for a wide
range  of values  of the threshold,  this difference  is significant  at the 5-10 percent
level. Figures  2(b),(c)  and (d) present  the same  information  for three subsamples  of
the data. Figures  2(b) and 2(c) restrict  the sample  to the 1971-81  and 1982-93
subperiods  respectively,  and reveal  that the difference  in current  account cyclicality
is much more  pronounced  in the latter period. However,  if we drop the two years
following  the 1973  and 1979  oil shocks  from the 1971-82  subperiod,  as is done in
Figure  2(d), the pattern  we emphasize  re-emerges.
In the theory  developed  above,  output shocks  are saved in both debtor and
creditor countries,  while the differential  current  account  behavior  in the two sets of
countries  arises  from the the differential  investment  response  to output  shocks.  In
debtor  countries,  a fraction  greater  than one of these  savings  is allocated  to
domestic  capital,  while in creditor  countries  a this fraction  is smaller  than one. The
24 We  remove  country  means  from  all variables  before  computing  the correlations.  We  test
for equality  of current  account  cyclicality  in  the  two  groups  as  follows:  First,  we  regress  the
current  account  on  per  capita  income  growth  in  the  two  subsamples.  Under  the  assumption
that  the  two  point  estimators  are  independent  and  asymptotically  normal,  we  can  construct
the  usual  Wald  statistic  for the  null  hypotheses  that  the  slope  coefficients  are  equal  in  the  two
subsamples.  A rejection  of this  null  hypothesis  constitutes  evidence  that  the cyclicality  of  the
current  account  differs  in  the  two  groups  of countries.
32third and fourth columns  of Table  2 provide  some  rough  indicators  of these two
pieces  of the theory. The third column  reports  the within-country  time-series
correlation  between  per capita  GNP growth and savings.  25  In all countries,  there is
a strong  positive  correlation  between  savings  and per capita income  growth at
annual  frequencies,  consistent  with the view that at least some  portion  of shocks  to
income  are saved in order  to smooth  consumption  over  time. As in the theory, there
is no obvious  relationship  between  the level of debt  and the cyclical  behaviour  of
savings.26  The final column  of Table 2 reports  the within-country  time series
correlation  between  savings  and the current  account. Consistent  with the theory,
there is a strong  negative  relationship  between  the level of debt of a country  and the
correlation  of savings  and the current  account. In six out of seven debtor countries,
savings  and the current  account  are negatively  correlated,  while in five out of six
creditors,  they are positively  correlated  (Sweden  and Japan again  are exceptions).
Other Explanations  for the Debtor/Creditor  Distinction
A notable  feature  of business  cycles  in OECD economies  is that they tend to
be highly  correlated  across  countries. 27 This observation  suggests  two possible
alternative  explanations  which  might  account  for the difference  in current  account
cyclicality  between  debtor and creditor  countries. First,  OECD-wide  economic
expansions  tend to be associated  with increases  in interest  rates. In fact, the time-
series correlation  between  OECD average  per capita GNP growth and growth in the
six-month  LIBOR  is 0.55. Thus, it is possible  that current  accounts  are
25 Savings  is defined  as net  national  savings,  expressed  as  a fraction  of GNP.
26 This  of course  does  not  rule  out  other  explanations  for the  procyclicality  of savings.  For
example,  if booms  redistribute  wealth  from  individuals  with  low  savings  propensities  to
individuals  with  high  savings  propensities,  savings  would  also  be  procyclical.  However,  as
long  as  individuals  allocate  their  wealth  using  investment  rules  such  as  the ones  discussed  in
this  paper,  our  effects  would  still  arise.
27 See  Costello  (1993)  and  Kraay  and  Ventura  (1997)
33countercyclical  in debtor countries  only because  domestic  booms coincide  with high
present  and expected  future debt service  obligations.
Second,  to the extent that countries  hold claims on foreign capital,  current
account  fluctuations  also reflect  domestic  and foreign residents'  decisions  on how
much  capital  to hold abroad.  This too can potentially  account  for the
countercyclicality  of current  accounts  in debtor countries.  To see  why, suppose  that,
consistent  with the notion  that they are high-productivity  countries,  debtor countries
tend  to invest less  abroad  than foreigners  invest  in them.  Then, provided  that all
investors  allocate  their marginal  unit of wealth among  assets in the same  proportions
as their average  wealth, favourable  income  shocks  that are correlated  across
countries  will produce  current  account deficits  in debtor countries  simply because
foreigners  purchase  more  claims  on debtor country  capital  than residents  of the
debtor  country  purchase  abroad.  In our sample,  the outward  investment  of debtor
countries  was on average  5.6% of GNP,  while inward  investment  in these countries
was 9.8%. In creditor  countries,  the corresponding  figures are 15.2%  and 11.1%.
To adequately  differentiate  our theory  from these  altematives,  we revisit  the
evidence  presented  above,  conditioning  on global shocks  such as changes  in world
interest  rates and foreign income.  This is done in Table 3 and Figure  3, which report
the partial  correlation  between  the current  account  surplus  and domestic  per capita
GNP growth,  controlling  for the growth  rate of the 6-month  LIBOR  and the growth
rate of OECD  per capita GNP excluding  the country  in question. 28 Now the cross-
country  correlation  between  the level of adjusted  debt and the cyclicality  of the
current  account  remains  negative,  and is equal  to -0.55. Figure  4 reports  the results
of dividing  the full sample  of countries  into debtors  and creditors  at various  threshold
28 A further  concern  might  be  that productivity  shocks  account  for a larger  share  of
fluctuations  in per  capita  GNP  growth  in debtor  countries  than  in creditors.  Although  there  are
no  a priori  reasons  to believe  in this  asymmetry,  it is possible  that  our  results  are  driven  by  it.
We  did experiment  with  controlling  for various  proxies  for productivity  shocks,  and  obtained
substantially  similar  results  to those  reported  here.
34levels  of debt. The pattem  which emerges  is similar  to that in Figure  2(a). However,
we can now only reject  the null hypothesis  that the cyclicality  of the current  account
is the same in debtor  and creditor  countries  over a smaller  range of threshold  levels
of debt.
355. Concluding Remarks
Using  a model  with quite conventional  ingredients,  we have derived  the novel
prediction  that, if investors  exhibit  constant  relative  risk aversion  and have no labour
income,  favourable  output shocks  lead to current  account  deficits  in debtor countries
and surpluses  in creditor  countries.  Under  these  assumptions,  the marginal  unit of
wealth (the income  shock)  is distributed  across  assets in the same  proportions  as
the average  one.  Since by definition  the share of a debtor country's  wealth devoted
to domestic  capital  exceeds  one,  an increase  in wealth (savings)  results  in a greater
increase  in domestic  capital  (investment),  leading  to a deficit on the current  account.
Conversely,  in creditor  countries  the increase  in wealth exceeds  investment  at home,
as a portion of this wealth increase  is invested  abroad.  This produces  a current
account  surplus  in creditor  countries.  We have also shown  that, if investors'  risk
aversion  varies  with wealth and in the presence  of labour  income,  there is a simple
rule to determine  when a positive  output shock  leads  to a current  account  deficit: the
country's  debt has to exceed  a threshold  that can be either positive  or negative,  and
is zero in the case of constant  relative  risk aversion  and no labour  income. We have
also provided  some  suggestive  evidence  from thirteen  OECD  countries  that is
consistent  with this prediction.
To make  progress  one must be willing  to make  assumptions,  and we have
not been shy about doing  so. Sovereign  risk and foreign investment  are two
important  features  of real economies  that we have left unmodelled  here.  We feel
confident  however  that our results  would survive  all but the most extreme  versions  of
models  that incorporate  these elements.  In our opinion,  the most glaring omission  of
this paper  is the absence  of adjustment  costs to investment.  In real economies
investment  is not "bang-bang"  as we have assumed  here.  Abstracting  from
adjustment  costs greatly simplifies  the analysis,  while permitting  us to isolate  the
36main economic  forces at work. The drawback  however  is that the effects  of all these
forces are collapsed  into a single  instant,  effectively  precluding  any meaningful
discussion  of the dynamic  aspects  of the current  account  responses  to shocks.  We
are currently  extending  the theory  to determine  how sluggish  investment  responses
to shocks  affect  the results  presented  here and, hopefully,  derive new results
regarding  the dynamic  aspects  of the current  account responses  to both output  and
productivity  shocks.
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39Appendix  1: Solution  Details
Optimal  Consumption  and Portfolio  Rules
Here  we derive  the  soluton  to the  consumers  problem  in the  model  of
Section  3, and  note  that  the  solution  to the  corresponding  problem  in Section  1
obtains  as the  special  case  where  Xj=pj=O.  The  representative  consumer  residing  in
country  j maximizes  (15)  subject  to the  budget  constraint  (16)  and  the  (correct  in
equilibrium)  belief that r is constant  and itj follows the dynamics  in Equation  (2).29
The Bellman  equation  for  this  problem  is:
p  V(aj xj)=  max ln(cj  +pj)+  V(  -[((lEj  -r).xj  +r).ai  +xj  -cj]+
<9'X?  Dai  ~~~~~~~~~~~~(Al)
+ a  V(a-,ij).  1X  .a?  .a2  ++.[V(aj  7i  +9(j))  V(ai'i  )
The  first  order-conditions  of this  problem  are:
- -V(ap  nj) = 0,  (A2)
c-V(aj,,Kj)  a2V(aj,,xj)  2
~~a 1 ) *(  - r) +  aa2  CT  v  -xa,  =O  (A3)
29 If  X 1=Pj=0,  the  solution  to  this  problem  is  correct  even  if  the  world  economy  is not  in  a
steady-state  with  a  constant  interest  rate.
40It can easily be verified  that the following  value function solves  the Bellian
equation:
V(aj,  ,) = p1 -In(aa +  +)  + g(j)  (A4)
where g(j)  does not depend on aj. Substituting  the derivatives  of the value function
into the first order conditions  (A2) and (A3)  yields Equations  (17) and (18).  These in
tum specialize  to Equations  (5) and (6) for the case of lj=fj=O.
The World  Steady-State
Here  we show that, if  lim  - *.j  +,Bj = 0, there exists  a steady-state  in
J=1
which both  the world average  productivity  and world growth rate are constants.  Let H
be the set of countries  with x,=  x,  and L be the set of countries  with W,  = X .
Remember  that each group contains  the same  number  of countries.  Therefore,  the
average  wealth of countries  in the two groups  is a = lim -*  a,  and
a =lmim  j  .a, Also, define s =  a.Using  this notation,  we can  write the world
interest  rate as r =  s *  i  + (1  s) _  - 2.
Next we show that there  exists a distribution  of wealth s* at which ds=O.  We
do so in four steps. First,  we note that, except  for the cases in  which a = 0 or a = 0,
di  da the condition  ds=O  requires  that da = d.  Second,  we note  that Equation  (19),  the
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assumption  that lim  - *x  +  pj = O,  and  the  fact  that  a fraction  +-dt  of countries
change  regime  each  period,  jointly  imply  that:
dia  ={(  +  (1  - s)  *  -)  +S  sX  + (1- s)-  *X  -0  _2p]  a +  (a-a  dt+
(A5)
+  (s+(1ii-  2im  2 *a  *doD,
da = {[(s*'  )  +s_c+(1-s).7c_2  _p  +i-aa  dt+
(A6)
(  5+S  53*  - Eim  2.Zai  dwi
Third,  we note  that,  conditional  on  the  ass  and  given  that  the  shocks  dcoj  are
independent  across  countries,  a straighfforward  application  of the  Law  of Large
2  2 Numbers  shows  that lim - Ea1 *  dc  = lim-J  .* ai  *  dco  i =  0. Fourth,  it follows  that
jd-I  ~~~~~id.
ds=O  if and  only  if:
s.(1-s)  [(1- 2 s).  (  -)  +2-(-)  +*(1-2*s)  =  (A7)
An analysis  of this  equation  reveals  that  there  exist  a solution  s*e(1/2,  1]. Hence,
taking  this  distribution  of wealth  as an initial  condition,  the  world  average  productivity
and  the  world  interest  rate  are  constant.  The  reader  can  easily  check  that  the  world
growth  rate  is also  constant.
42Appendix  2: Data  Sources
This paper uses data  on intemational  investment  positions  (lIPs) reported  in
the Intemational  Monetary  Fund's  Balance  of Payments  Statistics  Yearbook  (5th
Edition). Subject  to availability,  this source  reports  data on the stocks of various
assets held abroad  by residents  of a country,  and the corresponding  stocks of
domestic  assets  held by non-residents.  These stocks  of assets  are valued  at market
prices,  and hence  changes  in these stocks  reflect unrealized  capital  gains and
losses  which are not captured  in the usual flow measure  of the current  account.
In order to empirically  implement  our model,  we need to distinguish  between
three components  of the IIP: claims on foreign  capital held by the residents  of a
country (outward  equity claims), claims  on domestic  capital held by non-residents
of that country  (inward  equity claims),  and net holdings  of the intemational  bond.
Outward  equity claims  are measured  as outward  foreign  direct investment  plus
residents'  holdings  of corporate  equities  abroad. Similarly,  inward  equity claims are
measured  as inward  FDI plus non-residents'  holdings  of domestic  corporate  equities.
Finally,  net bond holdings  are proxied  by the non-reserves  residual  of the IIP,  which
includes  net public  and private bond holdings  and other  long- and short-term  capital.
Our sample  of countries  was determined  both by data availability  and
concems about data quality. We began  with a sample  of 20 OECD  economies.30
We then checked  the overall  IIP series  for these countries  against  that reported  in
Rider  (1994),  which presents  independent  estimates  of liPs based  on extensive
research  into national  sources. For most countries,  these  two sources  correspond
30  Greece,  Ireland  and  Iceland  were  immediately  dropped  from  the  sample  due  to extremely
limited  data  coverage.  The  Balance  of Payments  Statistics  Yearbook  reports  balance  of
payments  data  for an  aggregate  of Belgium  and  Luxembourg  only. This  reduces  the  original
sample  of 24  OECD  economies  by  four.
43quite closely. However,  we were forced  to drop Belgium/Luxembourg  and New
Zealand  due to major discrepancies  between  the two sources. Next,  we excluded
Portugal  and Switzerland  since IIP  data were available  only for eight years for each
of these countries. Finally,  we dropped Denmark,  Norway,  Turkey from the sample
since stock data on the subcomponents  of the IIP  we required  were not available. 3 1
This resulted  in fairly complete  series  on the IIP and its components  for 13 countries
between  1970 and 1993. The remaining  missing  values  in the sample  were
obtained  by cumulating  the corresponding  flow items  from the balance of payments
in order  to obtain a balanced  panel of 24 annual  observations  for each country  and
series.32
The remaining  data used in this paper (GNP  and net national  savings)  are
drawn  from the OECD's  national  accounts.
31 Stock  data  on  equity  holdings  not  available  for Norway  and  Turkey.  Stock  data  on  FDI  not
available  Turkey.
3254  out  of a  total  of 312  observations  were  obtained  in  this  manner,  all of them  in  the  early
1970s.
44Table 1- Debt and Adjusted Debt
(percent  of GNP,  average,  1970-1993)
Debt  Outward  Investment  Adjusted  Debt
(1)  (2)  (3)=(1)-(2)
Debtor Countries
Finland  24.3  3.2  21.1
Canada  26.0  13.3  12.7
Australia  16.6  6.6  10.0
Sweden  17.1  8.6  8.5
Austria  8.5  2.4  6.1
Italy  6.5  3.3  3.3
Spain  4.5  1.7  2.8
Creditor Countries
France  2.2  6.4  -4.2
Japan  -3.2  3.5  -6.7
United  States  3.2  11.1  -7.9
Germany  -3.5  5.8  -9.3
United  Kingdom  6.3  27.8  -21.5
Netherlands  -0.6  36.3  -36.9
Debtor Average  14.8  5.6  9.2
Creditor Average  0.7  15.2  -14.4Table  2  - Current  Account  Cyclicality  in Debtors  and Creditors
Adjusted  Debt  Correlalion  of Current  Account  Correlation  of Savings  Correlation  of Savings
(percent  of GNP)  with  Per  Capita  GNP  Growth  with  Per  Capita  GNP  Growth  with  Current  Account
Debtor  Countries
Finland  21.1  -0.02  0.76  -0.07
Canada  12.7  -0.31  0.55  -0.12
Australia  10.0  -0.04  0.42  -0.03
Sweden  8.5  0.32  0.48  0.31
Austria  6.1  -0.07  0.58  -0.23
Italy  3.3  -0.34  0.50  -0.11
Spain  2.8  -0.27  0.56  -0.18
Creditor  Countries
France  -4.2  0.05  0.62  0.05
Japan  -6.7  -0.17  0.24  -0.29
United  States  -7.9  0.25  0.28  0.54
Germany  -9.3  0.19  0.50  0.01
United  Kingdom  -21.5  0.02  0.46  0.00
Netherlands  -36.9  0.47  0.62  0.14
Debtor  Average  9.2  -0.10  0.55  -0.06
Creditor  Average  -14.4  0.13  0.45  0.07
Correlation  w/ Adjusted  Debt  -0.54  0.20  -0.26Figure  1:  Current  Account  Cyclicality  in Debtors  and Creditors
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